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Human evolution and religion. Some new Developments
Human evolution and religion
Some new developments
The theory of biological evolution proposes an explanation that is valid for 
all living things. Many features of human beings therefore fall within the ex-
planatory range of this theory, apparently including religious and moral be-
haviour. This explains why some prominent theologians of the twentieth centu-
ry have proposed ways of harmonizing the well-established empirical content 
of this theory with the rational expression of Christian faith1. Such attempts 
show a mature and responsible way of engaging in theological thinking. By 
overcoming the over-defensive attitude that most theologians adopted in the 
time of Galileo, theology can become an open, informed and creative dialog-
ical partner in modern debates without losing its fidelity to the Gospel and to 
Tradition. Even in this mature and responsible form however, theological work 
in the area of biology needs constant updating. These last decades, researchers 
have explored new, highly technical and concrete proposals concerning the 
emergence of religion as a biological phenomenon, but a sustained theological 
and philosophical evaluation of such proposals is still lacking. In this paper, I 
will therefore make a first step to address these recent proposals directly. This 
paper is not about the alleged neural correlate of a God-experience, which 
some researchers now call neuro-theology2. It is rather about explanations 
that are essentially evolutionary in their logical structure. These explanations, 
which constitute the main concern of the so-called cognitive science of reli-
gion, propose to explain the existence of religious beliefs by referring to nat-
1 For instance P. teIlHard de cHardIn, Le Phénomène humaine, Paris 1955; trans. B. Wall, 
The Phenomenon of Man, London 1959; K. raHner, Hominisation: the Evolutionary Origin of 
Man as a Theological Problem, Freiburg 1965; Pope PIuS xII, Humani Generis, Acta Apostol-
icae Sedis 42 (1950) 561-578.
2 For instance, A.B. neWBerg, Principles of neurotheology, Farnham, Surrey, England – 
Burlington, VT 2010.
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ural selection3. In the first section, I will start my inquiry by offering a brief 
overview of what current researchers have proposed as evolutionary explana-
tions of religion. Broadly speaking, there are three camps: some see religion 
as completely distinct from biology, some see it as a help for the survival of 
the species and others see it as a hindrance. In the rest of the paper, therefore, 
I dedicate one section to each of these positions, offering a critical evaluation 
of the arguments involved in each case. The main overall question guiding 
this paper is the following. To what extent are these relatively new, evolution-
ary explanations of religion plausible? A reply to this question promises to 
be useful not only for those engaged in the cognitive science of religion, for 
whom the various arguments may throw light on how to proceed further in 
their research. It could be useful also for those engaged in philosophical and 
theological anthropology by highlighting the essential biological substrate of 
all that is human. It may be useful to highlight at the very start that much of 
the reasoning and explaining in this area of research depends heavily on what 
we take religion to be. It is best therefore to see the arguments in the following 
pages as dealing with one or other feature of the religious phenomenon rather 
than with religion as a whole, whatever that may be.
I. tHe logIcal Structure oF evolutIonary exPlanatIon
In the most general sense, an evolutionary explanation is an attempt to de-
scribe, or account for, a system that is capable of reproducing itself, a system 
that is capable of self-replication. Typical systems of this kind are organic but 
we can also envisage evolutionary explanations for economic systems, or sys-
tems of software that can replicate themselves. In this general sense, an evolu-
tionary explanation is possible if the system has some special features. It needs 
to have at least one characteristic that is hereditary, a characteristic that does 
not disappear when the system replicates itself or passes from one generation 
to another. Moreover, this characteristic needs to show some random mutation 
from time to time and it needs to be crucial for the survival of the system as a 
whole. Once these three elements are present within a self-replicating system, 
natural selection occurs in the course of time. This very general description of 
an evolutionary explanation will be immediately recognizable as Charles Dar-
win’s classical proposal once we use «organism» instead of the more general 
term «system» and once we use the biological term «trait» instead of «charac-
teristic». It helps to recall that the expression «natural selection» can be some-
3 For a useful classification of types of research in this area, see: J.L. Barrett, «Is the spell 
really broken? Bio-psychological explanations of religion and theistic belief», Theology and 
Science 5:1 (2007) 57-72, DOI: 10.1080/14746700601159564. 
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what misleading because it seems to suggest that nature is somehow capable of 
selecting just as human beings can deliberate and select one object rather than 
another. Such a suggestion however is definitely not part of the theory. The 
theory proposes to explain changes without having recourse to any delibera-
tion. A better expression for natural selection would be environmental filtering. 
Organisms whose characteristics change in one particular direction may find 
themselves hindered in their reproduction, while others, with other changes 
in their characteristics, find themselves helped. The environment blocks some 
changes while it lets others proceed. Of course, for any given organism, there 
may be many traits that satisfy the triple condition for such a process to occur. 
In fact, natural selection can occur simultaneously at various fronts as regards 
the same species. 
How can this kind of explanation be extended to account for religion? 
Charles Darwin himself started to extend evolutionary explanation beyond the 
confines of biology and this extension continued by others after him with vary-
ing degrees of success. Current interest in extending evolutionary explanation 
beyond biology is very strong but I will focus only on its extension into the 
area of religion4. In line with the general logical structure mentioned above, for 
religion to fall within the range of this kind of explanation, it must have some 
feature that satisfies the triple condition. Hence, evolutionary psychologists 
interested in religion must first locate an aspect, or a feature of religion that can 
generate an evolutionary explanation. If there is such a feature, an explana-
tion will be available whereby the presence of this aspect could be seen as the 
product of natural selection. This method of inquiry within the philosophy of 
religion has given rise to many interesting studies. These may be classified into 
three broad camps. In one group, we find scholars who deny that there is any 
aspect of religion that is evolutionarily relevant. For these people, all aspects 
of religion are neutral. Religion confers neither advantages nor disadvantages 
for the survival of the organism. In another group, we have researchers arguing 
that there are indeed some aspects of religion that are adaptive. Their claim is 
that some aspects of religion confer a survival advantage on the organisms that 
have it. In another group, we have those who argue that religion confers serious 
disadvantages for survival, but that these disadvantages are counterbalanced 
by other traits. Let us now consider the arguments of each group in turn.
4 Typical recent studies include P. Boyer, Religion explained. The evolutionary origins of 
religious thought, New York 2001; S. atran, In gods we trust: the evolutionary landscape of 
religion, Oxford 2002; A. PlantInga, «Evolutionary argument against naturalism», in J. BeIlBy, 
ed., Naturalism defeated?, Ithaca, NY 2002, 1-12; D.S. WIlSon, Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolu-
tion, Religion, and the Nature of Society, Chicago 2003; J. ScHloSS – M.J. murray, ed., The 
Believing Primate, Oxford 2009. Major precedents include Charles Darwin himself in The de-
scent of man and selection in relation to sex, New York 18742.
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II. relIgIon aS non-adaPtIve
Philosophers who argue that religion is not adaptive hold that it offers no 
survival advantage whatsoever5. No features or aspects of the phenomenon 
of religion can be relevant for an evolutionary explanation. Religion is an 
epiphenomenon, a by-product that in itself has no adaptive value but is car-
ried along, in the course of evolutionary history, together with some traits 
that do have adaptive value6. To explain epiphenomenal characteristics of 
living things, biologists often use the term «spandrel». This is an architec-
tural term referring to a particular part of the overall structure of a build-
ing, a part that is in fact useless. Spaces or sculptures between beams and 
supporting arches are often spandrels in this sense. Biologists use this term 
analogously to indicate features of a living thing that are not relevant for 
survival and cannot therefore be explained by an evolutionary explanation. 
An example of a biological spandrel is the sound of heartbeat. What is evo-
lutionarily relevant as regards the heart is the way it pumps blood efficiently, 
not the sound it makes. Hence, the production of sound gets a free ride, as 
it were, all along the evolutionary development of the heart. The sound of 
heartbeat is not filtered off because, as regards natural selection, it is invis-
ible. In the same way, religion, according to this view, is a free rider. It is a 
phenomenon that exists simply because it «rides» on other human features 
that confer survival advantages. Religion itself however remains irrelevant 
from the point of view of natural selection. 
There may be some truth in this proposal but at least two weak points 
need to be highlighted. First, the proposal seems to suggest that what is 
not relevant for survival in the biological sense, what is not explainable 
via an evolutionary explanation, is not important in any sense. This can-
not be correct. What is not explainable today may indeed become explain-
able tomorrow, when we have more empirical evidence. This holds for the 
sound of heartbeat; it holds for other physical characterises of organisms 
that are classified as epiphenomenal today, and it holds also for religion. We 
judge whether a phenomenon is epiphenomenal or not always with respect 
to current information about the biological world. The second weakness of 
this position lies in the way it seems to remain blind to the specificity of 
5 A very clear case is made in P. Boyer, Religion explained (cf. nt. 4). See also J.M. BerIng, 
«Religious Concepts are Probably Epiphenomena: a reply to Pyysiäinen, Boyer, and Barrett», 
Journal of Cognition and Culture 3.3 (2003) 244-254.
6 The term epiphenomenon has various uses. In general, it refers to an effect that arises as 
a by-product rather than as the main result of a causal process. In philosophy of mind, mental 
events are called epiphenomena by those who hold that mental activity is a causally irrelevant 
by-product of physical causation in the brain. In this paper, I use the term as it is used in biology.
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Homo sapiens as a rational animal7. Surely not all aspects of rationality 
are associated with survival. Think of Beethoven’s composing of the Ninth 
Symphony and Michelangelo’s painting of the Sistine Chapel. Were these 
relevant for survival in the biological sense? They represent eminently hu-
man endeavours but are distinct from human survival as such. They are not 
outcomes of simple instrumental reasoning, or of concrete survival strate-
gies. It is therefore very plausible to hold that what happens at the higher 
levels of culture lies beyond the explanatory reach of evolution by natural 
selection. These higher levels are not biological as such. In this sense, we 
may indeed call them epiphenomena. To assume however that, since they 
are not within the range of evolutionary explanation, they are therefore less 
important would be to misread seriously the human phenomenon. What is 
specific of Homo sapiens is precisely this kind of intellectual dimension, 
which includes culture, art, and religion as well. What is epiphenomenal as 
regards biology constitutes the most important defining characteristic. The 
correct way of reasoning in this context therefore is to hold that the idea of 
an epiphenomenon could be useful as regards the physical aspect of Homo 
sapiens but would be inadequate if applied to the intellectual aspect. These 
observations have obliged some philosophers of biology to accept the intel-
lectual dimension of Homo sapiens, which includes religion, as the specific-
ity of this organism and to account for this as follows. They propose that the 
appearance of Homo sapiens in the course of the evolutionary history of the 
planet represents a crucial junction. It represents the point where evolution 
gave birth to a system that is no longer within its range, a system that floats 
freely8. It develops and evolves according to other criteria. 
The overall cogency of the arguments in favour of the idea that religion 
is non-adaptive remains therefore unclear. On the one hand, the religious di-
mension of human living lies at the higher cultural level involving symbolic 
meaning, artistic expression, existential longing, moral concern and other 
such abstract areas of rationality. It is plausible therefore to consider it de-
tached from what is purely biological. On the other hand, the human subject 
is undeniably biological, governed by the laws of adaptation. Assuming a 
clear dualism may be attractive to some, but it seems to be an evasion of the 
real question. 
7 If the recently discovered Homo sapiens idaltu (1997) were a genuine subspecies of the 
genus Homo, then we would identify current humans as the subspecies Homo sapiens sapiens. 
For this paper, I do not need to take sides on this contested issue and will therefore use the ex-
pression Homo sapiens throughout.
8 I borrow this expression from E. SoBer, Philosophy of Biology, Oxford 1993, 215: «Natu-
ral selection has given birth to a selection process that has floated free.»
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III. relIgIon aS adaPtIve
We consider now the other possibility, namely religion as adaptive. This is 
by far the more interesting position. It attempts to examine how the religious 
dimension of humanity, even though abstract, moral and symbolic, is rooted 
in what is biological and is somehow governed by the same rules. The basic 
motivation in this line of research is that the way we explain the biological can 
be relevant for the understanding of the higher cultural characteristics of Homo 
sapiens, at least as regards some aspects. The first challenge is to find an aspect 
of religion that is hereditary, mutable and crucial for survival. As mentioned 
above, if we find such a trait, we would be in a position to explain religion, at 
least as regards this one aspect. We would be able to explain religion as the 
result of natural selection. The literature in this area of research is extensive but 
two main proposals stand out, one dealing with the human propensity to detect 
agency, the other dealing with the human capacity to collaborate in spite of the 
possibility of cheating. 
To understand the first proposal, the best way to start is to recall some work 
in child psychology. Child psychologists have discovered that, when small in-
fants see moving dots or moving pictures on a screen, they readily attribute 
agency to them. Small infants often attribute purpose to movement. They are, 
in a sense, over-generous with the attribution of intentional states. Many re-
searchers take this observation to indicate that all humans have this intrinsic 
mental procedure or faculty that is constitutive of human nature. They are con-
vinced that that all human infants start with a tendency to exaggerate when it 
comes to attributing purpose and agency. As children grow older, they then start 
checking this exaggeration. They eventually limit the attribution of agency to 
other humans and to some animals. To refer to this mental procedure, cognitive 
scientists use the expression «hypersensitive agency detection device», HADD 
for short9. This a psychological feature, a disposition of a specific type. Ances-
tors of Homo sapiens who had this feature showed an exaggerated tendency 
to believe in the existence of agents in the natural environment in which they 
flourished. Such hominids were thus wary of various circumstances – wary of 
circumstances that were genuinely dangerous and wary also of circumstances 
that were not. This cognitive feature delivers many false positives. However, 
it definitely represents the safer strategy. In general, it is better to err on the 
side of being cautious than on the side of being careless. The capacity to detect 
dangerous agents is certainly important for survival. It is also hereditary and 
randomly mutable from one generation to the next. We have therefore all the 
9 E.g. S. atran, In gods we trust (cf. nt. 4); J. Barrett, Why would anyone believe in God? 
Walnut Creek, CA 2004; I. PyySIäInen, Supernatural agents: why we believe in souls, gods and 
buddhas, Oxford 2009.
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ingredients for natural selection. HADD represents an exaggerated form of 
agency-attribution. Since natural selection is possible in this context, cognitive 
psychologists of religion propose that, in our evolutionary past, hominids that 
were characterized by HADD had a survival advantage. Moreover, these cog-
nitive psychologists associate HADD with the belief in animistic powers with-
in nature and with the belief in God. For them, religion is essentially constitut-
ed by this disposition. It is an extrapolation of HADD. Humans have religious 
beliefs because they have been naturally selected according to HADD. Those 
of our ancestors with religion survived. Those without it were filtered off.
The second possible evolutionary explanation of religion has to do with suc-
cessful human collaboration in spite of the possibility of cheating. Philosoph-
ical work in this area builds upon some important achievements in the area of 
evolutionary ethics, concerning cooperation within groups. If natural selection 
depends on the survival of the individual, how can we explain cooperation? 
Apparently, we need to consider groups themselves as units of selection. Re-
search has shown that, if a group shows two particular characteristics, namely 
kin-selection (nepotism) and reciprocity (tit-for-tat), then natural selection fa-
vours groups of individuals that cooperate among themselves. This explana-
tion is convincing. Biologists have used it to explain the behaviour of various 
social animals, like ants and bees. It is however vulnerable because of one se-
rious problem. A cooperative group remains vulnerable to cheaters, sometimes 
called free riders: those who receive benefits from the group without contribut-
ing. This causes instability and it undermines the survival value of cooperation. 
Being a cheater, of course, needs the capacity to deceive, and this capacity 
varies depending on the intelligence of the organisms under consideration. For 
early humans, therefore, cooperation should have disappeared early on, under-
mined by their increasing intellectual abilities and the consequent ever more 
effective cheating. The fact that cooperation did not disappear shows that there 
must be something else in the story. Some special human feature must have 
been there to trump the effect of cheaters. And this is precisely the element 
that interests us here. The amazingly high degree of cooperation among hu-
mans shows that there is some pressure that acts against cheating. What could 
block humans from cheating? The proposal is that some early hominid groups 
shared a common belief in the existence of a super-human, omniscient judge. 
This belief ensured that individuals behaved well because they believed that, 
even when no colleague is aware of cheating or selfishness, punishment would 
still be delivered. They believed that superhuman forces observed and judged 
everything that individuals do within the group. This special belief made co-
operation possible and ensured a survival advantage to the groups that had it10. 
10 In this section, I draw from D. JoHnSon – J. BerIng, «Hand of God, Mind of Man: pun-
ishment and cognition in the evolution of cooperation», in J. ScHloSS – M.J. murray, ed., The 
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Cognitive scientists of religion use this kind of explanation to account for the 
origin of religion. They claim that the human religious dimension is a devel-
opment of this primordial condition for cooperation. Religion is an enhanced 
version of the innate primordial belief in the existence of an omniscient judge, 
or of a number of omniscient judges, who can ensure justice in all cases, even 
after death.
We have therefore two possible evolutionary explanations of religion. Some 
philosophers have used these explanations to discredit religion in general. They 
argue that religion is unacceptable because its central beliefs are not caused by 
the entities that these beliefs include or talk about; these beliefs arise from 
mechanisms that function independently from these entities. According to 
these philosophers, religion is a useful fiction. This proposal is different from 
the Platonic idea of a noble lie, allegedly propagated intentionally by an elite 
who want to conserve their power11. For evolutionary psychology, the causes 
at work are purely natural and have effects irrespective of political deliberation 
or deceptive psychological strategies. Evolution generates religious beliefs 
without any causal link between, say, God and the belief that God exists. The 
cause of the belief is not God but something else, something natural. This is the 
essence of the argument here. 
This kind of naturalistic anti-religious reasoning is not completely new. We 
find the same pattern for instance in Emile Durkheim’s and Sigmund Freud’s 
sociological and psychoanalytic theories of religion12. Both of them propose a 
natural explanation that allegedly discredits religion. For Durkheim, religion 
survives because its existence is correlated with that of society itself. Society 
depends on religion for its survival and regeneration. In his book Elementary 
Forms of Religious Life, he claims that «the effect of the cult really is to recre-
ate periodically a moral being upon which we depend as it depends on us. Now 
this being does exist: it is society»13. For Freud, the explanation of religion lies 
in the psychoanalytic nature of human beings and in their basic social unit, the 
family14. His main explanatory tool here is the idea of neurosis, understood as a 
Believing Primate (cf. nt. 4), 26-43. The argument is not that this evolutionarily-relevant aspect 
is the only feature that ensures cooperation. There may be other factors that block cheating or 
enhance cooperation. The argument, however, does say that the idea of a super-knowing judge 
is the major relevant feature. See also I. PyySIaïnen, How religion works: towards a new cogni-
tive science of religion, Leiden – Boston 2003.
11 Plato, Republic, Book 3, 414e–15c.
12 See for instance, J.S. PreuS, Explaining Religion: criticism and theory from Bodin to 
Freud, New Haven, CT 1987, especially chapters 8 and 9.
13 E. durkHeIm, Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. J. W. SWaIn, New York 1965, 
389.
14 Freud presents these ideas mainly in Totem and Taboo (Totem und Tabu: Einige Überein-
stimmungen im Seelenleben der Wilden und der Neurotiker, 1913); The Future of an Illusion 
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universal human predicament. Religious phenomena are the effects of a causal 
chain originating from a specific kind of psychological dynamic. For Freud, 
human evolution has an important role in this process because the individu-
al recapitulates the history of the species. Our current cognitive patterns and 
dispositions show traces of the original traumatic experiences whose effects 
have been hammered into the human psyche since the dawn of the species15. 
In Totem and Taboo, he creates a story about the disgruntled sons who over-
come, and eventually devour, their father because of the ambivalent relation 
they have with him, he being lovable but at the same time possessor of all 
the women. Freud offers this narrative as the cause of all religious beliefs and 
practices. Religion is the fulfilment of the need for adjustment when living the 
ambiguous relation with the powerful, attractive and yet repressive father16. 
We see here therefore how the evolutionary critique of religion is just one of 
the various possible naturalistic arguments that try to discredit religious belief. 
These arguments function by identifying the alleged natural cause of religious 
belief: evolutionary, social or psychological. They obtain their force from the 
assumption that the cause of a belief throws light on whether that belief is true 
or false. Let me now explore three possible ways of responding to such an ob-
jection. What I propose will be applicable to any objection that is based on the 
natural genesis of religious belief.
First, we need to examine the structure of the argument carefully. Is the 
logic correct? The objection seems to suffer because it involves the ad hoc 
fallacy. It proposes what philosophers sometimes called a «just-so» story – a 
historical conjecture, a narrative, in which the present state of affairs emerges 
as a conclusion. The story however remains, to some extent, unverifiable. This 
ad hoc element is clearly evident in Freud’s story of the disgruntled sons. He 
(Die Zukunft einer Illusion, 1927); Moses and Monotheism (Der Mann Moses und die mono-
theistische Religion, 1939).
15 Freud endorsed Ernst Haeckel’s doctrine that the development of the embryo, from fer-
tilization to birth or hatching, goes through phases that correspond to successive stages in the 
evolution of the animal’s distant ancestors. Haeckel’s hypothesis was that «ontogeny recapitu-
lates phylogeny». This hypothesis, known as the recapitulation theory, is nowadays untenable, 
at least in its strong sense, but it was dominant and widely accepted in Freud’s time. For Freud, 
mental recapitulation mirrored the physical one. He postulated that neuroses like phobias could 
have their origin in traumatic experiences not only in the patient’s past but also in the past of 
the human species as a whole.
16 This account of religion in Totem and Taboo is not Freud’s only account. It is distinct 
from the one he develops in The Future of an Illusion, where religion is the fulfilment of the 
wish to have a protective father in the face of the harsh realities of life that make us feel weak 
and helpless. Just as we needed a father during our childhood, so also we need religion for our 
adulthood. Current psychologists and psychoanalysts tend to consider this latter account much 
more acceptable than the one in Totem and Taboo.
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apparently engages in a relatively free construction within the broad contours 
of his overall project of making religion the result of a neurosis17. In the case 
of the evolutionary explanation, the ad-hoc element, although less evident, is 
present as well. The proponents of an evolutionary explanation create a story 
within the broad contours of evolutionary biology and then present it as the 
cause of current religious belief and practice. Of course, there may be other 
causal explanations for current religious belief and practice. Even within the 
limited domain of evolutionary explanation, there may be competing causal 
explanations, competing stories. The overall effect therefore of such an an-
ti-religion argument is not that it falsifies religious belief. It is rather that reli-
gious believers who are interested in knowing something about the causes of 
their beliefs have now more possible explanations available. They will have 
to evaluate each one and determine which one is best. We can understand this 
point better with the aid of an analogy. Peter believes he sees a faint cloud 
in the sky. He trusts his vision because it has served him well all his life. His 
friend however explains to him how, if there were a smudge on his glasses, 
it would cause him to believe that there is a cloud in the sky. What should 
Peter conclude? Is he obliged to abandon his belief that there is a cloud in the 
sky simply because a new explanation says that he could be mistaken? The 
answer is no. There is no obligation. What we can safely say is that Peter has 
now more than one explanation available. His belief could have been caused 
by the cloud itself or it could have been caused by something else, in which 
case his belief would be false. He has to judge which explanation is better. 
There is no definite falsification within such a procedure. A «just-so» story is 
not a knockdown argument. 
As a second way of responding to the evolutionary argument against re-
ligious belief, we can explore the analogy of vision a bit further. Religious 
believers can press the point that, if we assume that religious beliefs are 
the result of natural selection, we are saying that such beliefs confer an 
advantage on those who have them. Consider vision as an example. Vision 
confers evolutionary advantages on those who have it. It is not just the in-
ternal sensation of seeing that confers these advantages. It must be truthful 
vision. Mutations that result in organisms that see things where there are no 
things to be seen are dead ends. Such organisms are filtered off. Hence, vi-
sion’s adaptive attribute is related to the realism involved in seeing. We can 
extend this example to understand the faculty of reason. Correct reasoning 
confers evolutionary advantages because inferring and deducing correctly 
makes good reasoners survive where confused reasoners die off. It should 
17 Freud’s idea of neurosis is complex and does not correspond exactly to what the word 
conveys today. For him, it is possible to claim both that religion arose as the result of a kind of 
neurosis and that this development was a normal step in the advancement of humankind.
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be evident therefore that, once we assume at the start that having religious 
beliefs is adaptive, we are committed to some kind of efficiency with respect 
to these beliefs. True beliefs help enormously for survival. On the contrary, 
false beliefs make survival problematic. We should expect therefore that, 
over considerably long periods, false beliefs would disappear and true be-
liefs would remain because they prove their worth. If kidneys and hearts 
are effective in their domains, it is very plausible to hold that vision and 
intelligence are also. And, if religion is a special expression of affective 
and intelligent engagement with the world, then religion can be considered 
acceptable on these grounds. In other words, if belief in God is useful, than 
there is some truth in it. 
This kind of response, based on the realism inherent within the very idea 
of survival, is very plausible. Nevertheless, it may not be convincing to 
everyone. Some may feel that it draws too close an association between be-
lieving in God and believing in the existence of material things. Believing in 
God is certainly not the same as having beliefs about material things. These 
two kinds of belief may be similar but they are certainly not the same. In line 
with this point therefore, we can launch a third possible response on the part 
of religious believers. Defenders of religion may argue that evolutionary 
explanations, for example in terms of HADD or in terms of an all-knowing 
judge, are indeed acceptable. They may be a distant cause of religious be-
liefs and practices, but they are just one of the many causal factors involved. 
They may have indeed been operative at the dawn of intelligence within 
early hominids. These causal evolutionary explanations therefore could well 
correspond to what humans may have used as a first stepping-stone in their 
inquiry regarding global meaning and coherence. On this view, evolution-
ary explanations can supply us with some explanation but not with a full 
explanation. They can supply us with some element of our experience at 
the level of concrete material existence. From these, via a process of ab-
straction, we can derive knowledge of a higher order, knowledge of abstract 
objects, somewhat like what we do in mathematics. Mathematical knowl-
edge is distinct from empirical knowledge but concrete experience can help. 
It can suggest mathematical relations. We can say something similar are 
regards religious knowledge. Religious beliefs deal with the abstract level. 
Our knowledge of the abstract realm can indeed start with our experience 
at the concrete level, with our experience of objects and situations. This 
experience can serve as an intimation for the abstract level. We have here 
therefore a third possible response to the evolutionary criticism of religion. 
We can admit that there is indeed some truth conveyed by the evolutionary 
explanation but we refuse to limit religion to the content of this explanation. 
In other words, this response opposes those who claim that religion is noth-
ing more than what evolutionary psychologists propose. 
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In the preceding paragraphs, I have proposed three possible responses avail-
able to the religious believer who wants to block the typical anti-religion argu-
ment associated with evolutionary explanation. The last one seems to expose a 
general problem in this area: the problem of conceptual reductionism. Cogni-
tive scientists often tend to reduce a very complex phenomenon to one simple 
element. They then supply an evolutionary explanation for this one element 
and declare that they have explained the entire complex phenomenon. This 
kind of reduction, especially when concerning religion, cannot be a correct 
way of inquiry. When scientists concentrate only on what is measurable, they 
can miss other aspects that can be more important than what is measurable. 
Consider for instance the meaning of human love. It would be very strange to 
hold that the real meaning of human love is the action of hormones in the body. 
It is true that the action of these chemicals is important, especially as a kind of 
communication between different organs within the human body. It is true that 
hormones are especially active when people love one another. The meaning of 
love however is much more than the action of hormones. The empirical dis-
covery regarding hormones represents an achievement, but this empirical truth 
does not exhaust all the reality of love. The depth of meaning associated with 
love remains to a very great extent completely unaffected by these empirical 
discoveries, important as they are. When love is described as real, nothing is 
being said about the chemicals involved in that experience. What is being said 
is situated at another level. The scientific discovery changes the broad con-
cept and experience of love only at one tiny spot, if it does at all. The case of 
religion is similar. Suppose that evolutionary psychology has established for 
everyone’s satisfaction that religion is definitely the result of HADD. Should 
this claim oblige us to reduce the concept of religion to HADD? Should we say 
that we have now discovered what religion really is? The answer is no. We may 
have discovered an important part of the origin of our knowledge of God. We 
may have discovered one important stage within the process whereby humans 
struggled to acquire more and more knowledge about the hidden movements 
of nature, about the original causes of these movements, and then ultimately 
about God, as the origin and sustainer of all. The way I am expressing my po-
sition here assumes, of course, that God, in Himself, is in no way dependent 
on what humans know about Him or on whether they know about Him at all. 
Those who insist that God is nothing more than a projection of human aspi-
rations and longings in some form or other, will not accept this assumption. 
To the extent that their not accepting this assumption defines their research 
program, the dialogue is bound to stall at this fundamental point. Religious 
believers cannot aspire to oblige their opponents, through reason and argu-
ments, to accept the religious outlook, ignoring the essential freedom inherent 
within religious faith. They can however show, as I have tried to do here, that 
approving the scientific value of evolutionary explanations of some part of 
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the religious phenomenon does not oblige us to adopt a reductionist approach. 
The traditional tenets of organized religion in the Judeo-Christian tradition are 
indeed compatible with some evolutionary explanations18. 
The upshot of this section therefore is that if religion is adaptive and if the 
evolutionary explanations proposed are acceptable, there is no obvious con-
tradiction with the central claims of religion. Religious belief includes various 
dispositions that the person acquires over time. Such dispositions, of course, 
can be of the individual person, or of the particular group or of the tradition 
that the person belongs to, or even of the entire species as a whole. Some of 
these dispositions, in their primordial form, may indeed be well explained via 
evolution. It is certainly plausible to argue that HADD explains to some extent 
the disposition to believe in the existence of a cause of the universe. There is 
no obvious conceptual problem here. We can say the same thing as regards the 
evolutionary explanation involving the belief in a super-knowing judge. It is 
plausible to argue that such a belief in a super-knowing judge is the result of 
natural selection and is, to some extent, responsible for a disposition to believe 
in the afterlife and in the last judgment. There is nothing intrinsically contra-
dictory in making this claim, as long as we do not add the reductive clause that 
religion is just this disposition and nothing else.
Iv. relIgIon aS mal-adaPtIve
Can religion be seriously disadvantageous for the individual? The main idea 
here is that we can compare religion to a virus or a parasite. Just as we have 
parasites or viruses that use the host animal for their survival, often debilitating 
or even killing their host, so also we can have ideas that use the human mind 
for their survival. Daniel Dennett for instance compares religious people to 
ants infected by a minute parasitic flatworm called a lancet fluke. This parasite 
makes the ant behave irregularly, climbing blades of grass incessantly with no 
apparent reason. Cows that eat the grass will assimilate the ant and this allows 
the parasite to complete its reproductive cycle by passing through the cow’s 
18 In this context, we need to recall moreover that the term religion is vague in the logical 
sense. It has no clear boundaries. What we call religions share indeed similarities between them 
but there is no guarantee that a core of features is shared by all. It is very probable that there is 
no such common core. The more data we get from cultural anthropology, the more the idea of a 
common essence of religion becomes unlikely. The concept of religion is like the Wittgenstein-
ian concept of game, or even worse – worse because some religions involve a very high degree 
of self-reflection and self-adjustment, which implies an ongoing transformation of their very 
nature. It is possible to argue that we gain precision in this kind of inquiry if we consider faith 
instead of religion. See L. caruana, «Is Religion undermined by Evolutionary Arguments?», 
European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 2 (2010) 85-106.
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gut. Dennett suggests that we can account for religion in the same way. An idea 
can make an individual behave irregularly. It can make the individual, for in-
stance, engage in self-harm. The idea affects individuals in this way in view of 
its own project of spreading more extensively, in view of becoming embedded 
in other minds. Dennett and other researchers in this area often use the word 
«meme» to refer to such an idea. A meme is a cultural unit that can be transmit-
ted from mind to mind, a unit that normally consist of some mutually related 
ideas, symbols or practices. It is the cultural analogue of the unit of biological 
heredity, the gene. Religion is a typical meme19. 
To understand and critically evaluate the main point of this critique, we 
need to make at least two important clarifications. Philosophers who describe 
genes, viruses or memes as wanting to use a human being for their own advan-
tage seem to be attributing intentionality to these entities. Such an attribution 
seems completely misplaced and any anti-religion argument resulting from 
such explanations would therefore be unfounded. These philosophers however 
are often aware of this danger. They concede that, although we are inclined 
to describe genes, viruses and memes as having intentions and desires, we 
should recall that this way of describing nature is just a result of our limited 
vocabulary. Our language is an extension of our everyday life and is there-
fore highly intentional. Their proposal therefore is that the finality evident in 
processes involving genes, viruses and memes is purely natural, the result of 
natural selection. There is no misplaced anthropomorphism. The second clari-
fication has to do with the resilience of religion. As the history of the twentieth 
century shows, highly organized and extensive campaigns to eradicate religion 
have failed. There is something in religion that makes it re-emerge. So, even 
if religion were really mal-adaptive and detrimental to the individual, we need 
to assume that there is some other force to counterbalance its negative effect. 
Otherwise, religion would have disappeared thousands of years ago. Of course, 
philosophers who describe religion as a harmful meme, or as a kind of mental 
disease, often see themselves as the cure. They see themselves as the essential 
factor that liberate humanity from the evil effects of religion. The situation 
however cannot be that simple. If we consider the religious dimension of hu-
manity as a natural phenomenon, we should consider the anti-religious move-
ment as a natural phenomenon also. This follows from the fact that religion and 
anti-religion have coexisted since the dawn of history. Current atheists seldom 
realize that they constitute just one other voice in a long tradition that is as old 
as religion itself. If we limit ourselves to evolutionary explanation, whatever 
has survived the long stretch of evolutionary history must have survival value. 
We cannot therefore say that, since we have an evolutionary explanation of the 
biological basis of religion, therefore religion is discredited. If we were to say 
19 D.C. dennett, Breaking the spell: religion as a natural phenomenon, New York 2006.
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that, we would be obliged to discredit anti-religion in the same way. We would 
be obliged to discredit even science itself in the same way. If discrediting were 
the major aim of evolutionary explanation, the entire method of evolutionary 
reasoning beyond biology, at least in this context, would need careful reconsid-
eration. Otherwise, it would undermine itself20. 
concluSIon
The line of argument in this paper dealt with three positions. It focused on 
those who argue that religion as completely distinct from biology, those who 
argue that religion is adaptive and those who claim that religion is mal-adap-
tive. To what extent are such evolutionary explanations of religion plausible? 
Those who say that religion is epiphenomenal limit their visual field to what is 
biological and therefore run the risk of neglecting the most important dimen-
sion of Homo sapiens, namely rationality. Those who claim that religion is 
adaptive can indeed help us understand possible original natural dispositions 
that may have predisposed hominids to seek higher levels of understanding. 
They need to recall however that the phenomenon of religion is complex. To 
understand it, we need to resort to both causes and reasons, which are both 
involved in the way humans assent to what they believe. People sometimes 
feel caused, or mechanically constrained, to believe something and then they 
decide to accept that belief, making it their own by acting upon it. In such 
cases, they willingly accept what they feel inclined to believe. To the extent 
that the reasoning I presented in the second section of this paper is correct, 
genuine religious belief in its present form operates therefore like this. It is the 
deliberate acceptance of what the believer is naturally inclined to believe. In 
the final section of the paper, I then considered those who claim that religion 
is mal-adaptive. I argued that they face the problem of how to explain reli-
gion’s resilience against all odds. This point might make religious believers 
want to welcome evolutionary explanation. They might want to argue that, 
20 Charles Darwin himself recognized that evolutionary explanation could apparently un-
dermine itself. In one of his letters, he expresses concern about the apparent implication that 
even his own mind, which is discovering the laws of evolution, is itself the result of evolution. 
«But then arises the doubt, can the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed 
from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animals, be trusted when it draws such 
grand conclusions [regarding the ultimate cause of all things]? I cannot pretend to throw the 
least light on such abstruse problems. The mystery of the beginning of all things is insoluble 
by us; and I for one must be content to remain Agnostic.» Quoted by Darwin’s son, Francis, 
in a biography of 1876. See F. darWIn (ed.), The life and letters of Charles Darwin, including 
an autobiographical chapter, London 1887, Vol. 1, chapter VIII, 313; available online: http://
darwin-online.org.uk/
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since religions have survived the long sweep of evolutionary time, religious 
claims must be true. This move however would neglect the fact that both reli-
gion and anti-religion have survived the long sweep of evolutionary time. The 
struggle itself between religion and anti-religion is apparently part of human 
nature. This does not mean however that a complacent attitude is preferable. 
There have definitely been social practices, often with religious connotation 
or justification, which definitely needed correction or elimination. Think of 
child-sacrifice, witch-hunting, Chinese-style foot-binding, genital mutilation, 
and others. For progress, correct and honest reasoning is indispensable. Wheth-
er we accept evolutionary explanations of religion or not, we need to uphold 
ongoing self-evaluative and self-corrective processes within religious commu-
nities. This remains the best policy21.
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This paper critically examines three positions in the area of the evolutionary psy-
chology of religion: the one according to which religion is completely beyond the 
reach of any evolutionary explanation, the one according to which religion is adaptive 
in the evolutionary sense, and the one according to which religion is mal-adaptive, in 
the sense that it confers no survival advantages but rather disadvantages. The result of 
the critical evaluation of these positions indicate that the embodied rationality of Homo 
sapiens renders evolutionary explanations applicable and important but only to some 
extent. Genuine religious belief involves a dimension that is material, and therefore 
evolutionarily explainable, and a dimension that is not, namely the believer’s act of 
deliberately accepting or not accepting what he or she is naturally inclined to believe.
Keywords: belief, Darwin, evolution, psychology, religion 
RIASSUNTO
L’articolo esamina criticamente tre posizioni nell’ambito della psicologia evolutiva 
della religione: la posizione secondo la quale la religione sia al di là del raggio di qual-
siasi spiegazione evolutiva, la posizione secondo la quale la religione sia adattiva nel 
21 Acknowledgements: Rachel Blass, the participants of the philosophical theology Research 
Seminar of Boston College, and the participants of the Faculty of Philosophy Research Seminar 
at the Gregorian University.
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senso evolutivo, e la posizione secondo la quale la religione sia mal-adattiva nel senso 
che non conferisca nessun vantaggio di sopravvivenza ma piuttosto degli svantaggi. Il 
risultato della valutazione critica di queste posizione indica che la razionalità incarnata 
di Homo sapiens rende le spiegazioni evolutive applicabili e importanti ma soltanto 
parzialmente. La credenza religiosa genuina coinvolge una dimensione materiale, e 
dunque spiegabile in termini della psicologia evolutiva; coinvolge anche una dimensi-
one che non è materiale, cioè l’atto da parte del credente di deliberatamente accettare 
o non accettare ciò che lui è naturalmente propenso a credere.
Parole chiave: credenza, Darwin, evoluzione, psicologia, religione
